What's missing on the left?

While I had heard an occasional mention during the past four years of The Project for a New American Century and its September 2000 publication titled Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, I had not realized how close to paranoia the beliefs of the political left are regarding the “neo-cons” and this publication.

Former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV stated at a forum hosted by The Century Foundation and the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation on February 15, 2005, and broadcast by C-Span2 on “Book TV” on February 19, 2005, that the “neo-cons” in the Bush administration had already decided to increase military spending for imperialist purposes and to use military force in the Middle East, specifically against Iraq – and just needed a catastrophe like Pearl Harbor to provide the impetus.

This statement by Wilson is such utter nonsense that paranoia may be the true explanation for such delusional thoughts.

What has happened to the left of the American political spectrum?

The forum consisted of several people, at least two of whom (Wilson and Clare Short) had contributed to the book which apparently prompted the broadcast on “Book TV” – Patriotism, Democracy, and Common Sense: Restoring America's Promise at Home and Abroad, edited by Alan Curtis.

Wilson cited page 67 of the September 2000 paper as the place to look for a plain statement of the "neo-con's" desire, but that page mentioned Pearl Harbor only in the context of saying that the Navy’s leaders may resist change in their force structure so much that the Navy will be unprepared for warfare as it may be waged in the future:

For the moment, the U.S. Navy enjoys a level of global hegemony that surpasses that of the Royal Navy during its heyday. While the ability to project naval power ashore is, as it has always been, an important subsidiary mission for the Navy, it may not remain the service’s primary focus through the coming decades. Over the longer term – but, given the service life of ships, well within the approaching planning horizons of the U.S. Navy – the Navy’s focus may return again to keeping command of the open oceans and sea lines of communication. Absent a rigorous program of experimentation to investigate the nature of the revolution in military affairs as it applies to war at sea, the Navy might face a future Pearl Harbor – as unprepared for war in the post-carrier era as it was unprepared for war at the dawn of the carrier age.

Wilson apparently meant to refer to this passage at pages 50 and 51, which is the only other mention of Pearl Harbor in the 90-page paper, but it merely states a truism – the significant changes recommended in the paper would occur at a pace dictated by several factors, unless there occurred a “catalyzing event” that caused change to occur much more quickly:

Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The United States cannot simply declare a “strategic pause” while experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to pursue a transformation strategy that would decouple American and allied interests. A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities for projecting force from the United States, for example, and sacrificed forward basing and presence, would be at odds with larger American [pg. 51] policy goals and would trouble American allies.

Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor. Domestic politics and industrial policy will shape the pace and content of transformation as much as the requirements of current missions. A decision to suspend or terminate aircraft carrier production, as recommended by this report and as justified by the clear direction of military technology, will cause great upheaval. Likewise, systems entering production today – the F-22 fighter, for example – will be in service inventories for decades to come. Wise management of this process will consist in large measure of figuring out the right moments to halt production of current-paradigm weapons and shift to radically new designs. The expense associated with some programs can make them roadblocks to the larger process of transformation – the Joint Strike Fighter program, at a total of approximately $200 billion, seems an unwise investment. Thus, this report advocates a two-stage process of change – transition and transformation – over the coming decades.

Anyone with the slightest knowledge of the U.S. Navy would recognize the truth of the statements made in those two paragraphs. For example, the recommendation to “terminate aircraft carrier production” would meet resistance similar to, if not greater than the resistance of the battleship Navy to the coming of the aircraft carrier era.

How in the dickens could sane people come to the conclusions stated by Wilson? No one at the forum blinked, much less disputed what he claimed.

Wilson and the people at that forum aren't the only ones who believe such nonsense.

Something is missing on the left. Is it knowledge? Is it a firm grip on reality? What’s missing?