Croker Sack

"Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard." — Henry Louis Mencken (1880-1956)

Sunday, November 21, 2004

Making decisions without the use of a time machine

In view of the definition of "link," what could Mick Horan have meant by the last clause in his letter to the editor of The Sun?

It seems apparent from the context that Horan believes there was no "link," but what does he think that word means?

It seems plain that there were several contacts between al Qaeda (including Osama bin Laden himself) and Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime.

Despite evidence of such contacts, there has not yet been found clear evidence that al Qaeda and Saddam's Iraq had actually worked together.

The threat addressed by the Bush administration involved possible future actions by Iraq and al Qaeda. Faced with the evidence of contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq--which had indicated their desire to form a collaborative relationship--President Bush had to decide whether the probability that such a relationship would develop in the future was too great to ignore.

President Bush decided that the threat could not be ignored. Future cooperation between a terrorist organization that was seeking weapons of mass destruction for use against the U.S. and a dictator who could supply those weapons was too likely to occur.

Horan perceives himself as a man who is difficult to fool--a man who takes the "time to search for the truth."

Yet, he seems unable to understand that falsely denying the existence of evidence which supported a decision is not a valid way to criticize the decision.

The rationale for the use of military force to disarm Iraq was--with regard to "WMDs" and the possibility of their use by al Qaeda--based on the threat of an attack by terrorists in the future, not a past attack on the U.S. by Iraq.

Saddam's regime had been obligated to cooperate with the UN in destroying Iraq's WMDs, but had refused for more than 10 years to meet that obligation.

Waiting several years longer before requiring the disarming of Iraq was no longer a risk that could be accepted, once al Qaeda had demonstrated a willingness to attack the U.S. in ways which were previously unimaginable. The more time that passed, the more time there was for chemical and biological weapons to be transferred into the hands of terrorists.

Virtually every knowledgeable and reasonable person in the world believed--prior to the invasion--that Saddam's regime still possessed WMDs.

Finding out after the invasion that no stockpiles of weapons can be found has no relevance to the decision to invade, because the decision was already made before the subsequent non-discovery of stockpiles could be known.

The decision had to be made with the available information. The decision could not be based on the information which would become available months later--after Saddam's regime was removed from power.

We don't have the ability to travel into the future to examine the results of our decisions before we make those decisions.

Since no one has this ability, basing criticism of a decision on information which could not have been known by the decision maker is irrational.

It is possible for reasonable people to disagree about the decision made by President Bush, but it is not possible to base a reasonable opinion on facts which could not have been known until after the decision was made--just as it is not possible to honestly deny the existence of evidence of numerous contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq which indicated that a real threat existed.

Here's the definition of "link":
Link--noun--"4 anything serving to connect or tie (a link with the past)." Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th ed.)

Here is Horan's letter published in The Sun, November 21, 2004:
To the Editor:

Well it's plain to see a recent letter-writer has bought into the Swift Boat Veterans' lies — hook line and sinker.

Never mind that the "so-called" charges were discredited by major newspapers and others. And, oh yeah, Kerry's crewmen, I mean the guys that were ON THE BOAT. I know about the one guy that wasn't (I'm sure you've heard the term Flip-Flop).

All I can say is that it's sad that attack ads work and people will not look beyond the talking heads on TV and invest a little time to search for the truth themselves.

They let their ideology get in the way of reason. Maybe the letter-writer subscribes to the philosophy "You can fool some of the people all of the time." I imagine the writer still believes that Iraq has WMD's and that there was a link between Saddam and al-Qaida.

The election was over two weeks ago ... the ads worked ... move on.

Mick Horan

Here are the pertinent parts of The 9/11 Commission Staff Report, released 17 June 2004:

Page 5:

In light of the historical animosity between Shia and Sunni Muslims, the confirmation of the Hezbollah role in the [1996 Khobar Towers] attack led many to conclude that Bin Ladin's Sunni-populated organization would not have been involved. Later intelligence, however, showed far greater potential for collaboration between Hezbollah and al Qaeda than many had previously thought. A few years before the attack, Bin Ladin's representatives and Iranian officials had discussed putting aside Shia-Sunni divisions to cooperate against the common enemy. A small group of al Qaeda operatives subsequently traveled to Iran and Hezbollah camps in Lebanon for training in explosives, intelligence and security. Bin Laden reportedly showed particular interest in Hezbollah's truck bombing tactics in Lebanon in 1983 that had killed 241 U.S. Marines. We have seen strong but indirect evidence that his organization did in fact play some as yet unknown role in the Khobar attack.

Bin Ladin also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime. Bin Ladin had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded Bin Ladin to cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Ladin in 1994. Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after Bin Ladin had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship. Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.

Page 12:

Al Qaeda remains extremely interested in conducting chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. In 1994, al Qaeda operatives attempted to purchase uranium for $1.5 million; the uranium proved to be fake. Though this attempt failed, al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic objective of obtaining a nuclear weapon. Like-wise, it remains interested in using a radiological dispersal device or "dirty bomb," a conventional explosive designed to spread radioactive material. Documents found in al Qaeda facilities contain accurate information on the usage and impact of such weapons.

Al Qaeda had an ambitious biological weapons program and was making advances in its ability to produce anthrax prior to September 11. According to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, al Qaeda's ability to conduct an anthrax attack is one of the most immediate threats the United States is likely to face. Similarly, al Qaeda may seek to conduct a chemical attack by using widely-available industrial chemicals, or by attacking a chemical plant or a shipment of hazardous materials.

Here are the relevant portions of the 9/11 Commission Report, released 22 July 2004:

Executive Summary, page 16:

Are We Safer?

Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have killed or captured a majority of al Qaeda’s leadership; toppled the Taliban, which gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan; and severely damaged the organization. Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be? The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force. Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts. Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue. Because of offensive actions against al Qaeda since 9/11, and defensive actions to improve homeland security, we believe we are safer today. But we are not safe. We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure.

Page 17:

+ + + Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.

+ + +

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: (1) attack terrorists and their organizations, (2) prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

Chapter 2, Page 61:

Turabi [Sudan's Islamist leader] sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983.The relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations. As will be described in chapter 7, al Qaeda contacts with Iran continued in ensuing years.52

Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda—save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against Crusaders” during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army.53

To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad’s control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin’s help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.54

With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request.55 As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections.

Footnote 55:

55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004).

Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq’s intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission. The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received “third hand,” passed from the foreign government service that “does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service.” The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin’s Sudan farm in December 1995.

Page 65:

Though Bin Ladin had promised Taliban leaders that he would be circumspect, he broke this promise almost immediately, giving an inflammatory interview to CNN in March 1997. The Taliban leader Mullah Omar promptly “invited” Bin Ladin to move to Kandahar, ostensibly in the interests of Bin Ladin’s own security but more likely to situate him where he might be easier to control.73

Footnote 73:

73. On Bin Ladin’s promise to Taliban leaders, see government exhibit no. 1559-T, United States v. bin Laden. For the Bin Ladin interview, see CNN broadcast, interview of Bin Ladin by Peter Arnett on Mar. 20, 1997, May 9, 1997 (available online at According to KSM, Bin Ladin moved to Kandahar “by order of Emir Al-Mouminin,” that is, Mullah Omar. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On the Taliban’s invitation to UBL, see Mike briefing (Dec. 12, 2003); Rashid, Taliban, p. 129. Rashid has also described the move as part of Bin Ladin’s plan to solidify his relationship with, and eventually gain control over, the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003).

Page 66:

There is also evidence that around this time Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. According to one report, Saddam Hussein’s efforts at this time to rebuild relations with the Saudis and other Middle Eastern regimes led him to stay clear of Bin Ladin.74

In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin’s public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin’s Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December.75

Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides’ hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States.76

Footnote 76:

76. CIA analytic report, “Ansar al-Islam: Al Qa’ida’s Ally in Northeastern Iraq,” CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003. See also DIA analytic report, “Special Analysis: Iraq’s Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida,” July 31, 2002; CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties,” Mar. 10, 2003. We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 contacts. They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004. Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum, “Requested Modifications to ‘Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq–al Qaida Contacts (1990–2003),’” Dec. 10, 2003, p. 5).

Chapter 7, page 228:

Atta’s Alleged Trip to Prague

Mohamed Atta is known to have been in Prague on two occasions: in December 1994, when he stayed one night at a transit hotel, and in June 2000, when he was en route to the United States. On the latter occasion, he arrived by bus from Germany, on June 2, and departed for Newark the following day.69

The allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001 originates from the reporting of a single source of the Czech intelligence service. Shortly after 9/11, the source reported having seen Atta meet with Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, an Iraqi diplomat, at the Iraqi Embassy in Prague on April 9, 2001, at 11:00 A.M. This information was passed to CIA headquarters.

The U.S. legal attaché (“Legat”) in Prague, the representative of the FBI, met with the Czech service’s source. After the meeting, the assessment of the Legat and the Czech officers present was that they were 70 percent sure that the source was sincere and believed his own story of the meeting. Subsequently, the Czech intelligence service publicly stated that there was a 70 percent probability that the meeting between Atta and Ani had taken place. The Czech Interior Minister also made several statements to the press about his belief that the meeting had occurred, and the story was widely reported.

The FBI has gathered evidence indicating that Atta was in Virginia Beach on April 4 (as evidenced by a bank surveillance camera photo), and in Coral Springs, Florida on April 11, where he and Shehhi leased an apartment. On April 6, 9, 10, and 11,Atta’s cellular telephone was used numerous times to call various lodging establishments in Florida from cell sites within Florida. We cannot confirm that he placed those calls. But there are no U.S. records indicating that Atta departed the country during this period. Czech officials have reviewed their flight and border records as well for any indication that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001, including records of anyone crossing the border who even looked Arab. They have also reviewed pictures from the area near the Iraqi embassy and have not discovered photos of anyone who looked like Atta. No evidence has been found that Atta was in the Czech Republic in April 2001.

According to the Czech government, Ani, the Iraqi officer alleged to have met with Atta, was about 70 miles away from Prague on April 8–9 and did not return until the afternoon of the ninth, while the source was firm that the sighting occurred at 11:00 A.M. When questioned about the reported April 2001 meeting, Ani—now in custody—has denied ever

Page 229:

meeting or having any contact with Atta. Ani says that shortly after 9/11, he became concerned that press stories about the alleged meeting might hurt his career. Hoping to clear his name, Ani asked his superiors to approach the Czech government about refuting the allegation. He also denies knowing of any other Iraqi official having contact with Atta.

These findings cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Atta was in Prague on April 9, 2001. He could have used an alias to travel and a passport under that alias, but this would be an exception to his practice of using his true name while traveling (as he did in January and would in July when he took his next overseas trip). The FBI and CIA have uncovered no evidence that Atta held any fraudulent passports.

KSM and Binalshibh both deny that an Atta-Ani meeting occurred. There was no reason for such a meeting, especially considering the risk it would pose to the operation. By April 2001, all four pilots had completed most of their training, and the muscle hijackers were about to begin entering the United States.

The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting.70

Footnote 70:

70. For Czech source reporting and credibility assessment, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Eliska T. interview (May 20, 2004). For the information being reported to CIA, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). For the leak and the ministers’ statements, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). On April 4, 2001, Atta cashed an $8,000 check at a bank in Virginia Beach; he appears on a bank surveillance tape. For FBI evidence of Atta being in Virginia Beach, see FBI report, “Hijackers Timeline,” Dec. 5, 2003 (Apr. 4, 2001, entry citing 265ANY-280350-302-615, 688, 896, 898). For FBI evidence of Atta being in Coral Springs, see ibid. (Apr. 11, 2001, entries citing 265A-NY-280350-302, serial 381; 265A-NY-280350-MM, serials 3817, 5214). For Czech government finding no evidence of Atta’s presence and having evidence that Ani was not in Prague, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004). Aside from scrutinizing various official records, the Czech government also reviewed surveillance photos taken outside the Iraqi embassy. CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). None of the people photographed that day resembled Atta, although the surveillance only operated from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. CIA cable, review of surveillance photos, Feb. 27, 2002. For Ani’s denials of any meetings and request to superiors, see CIA briefing (Jan. 28, 2004); Intelligence report, interrogation of Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani, Oct. 1, 2003. For KSM’s denial of the meeting, see Shirley interview (Apr. 29, 2004). Binalshibh has stated that Atta and he were so close that Atta probably would have told him of a meeting with an Iraqi official. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 2, 2002. Binalshibh also stated that Bin Ladin was upset with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for committing atrocities against Iraqi Muslims, and that Bin Ladin would never have approved such a meeting. Intelligence report, interrogation of Binalshibh, Oct. 4, 2002. For Atta not using an alias during his July 2001 trip, see FBI memo, Penttbom investigation, Jan. 14, 2002.

Chapter 10, Page 334:

Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled “Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.” Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no “compelling case” that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons.62

Footnote 62:

62. NSC memo, Kurtz to Rice, Survey of Intelligence Information on any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks, Sept. 18, 2001. On 60 Minutes (CBS, Mar. 21, 2004), Clarke said that the first draft of this memo was returned by the NSC Front Office because it did not find a tie between Iraq and al Qaeda; Rice and Hadley deny that they asked to have the memo redone for this reason.


Blogger Al Hedstrom said...

Despite evidence of such contacts, there has not yet been found clear evidence that al Qaeda and Saddam's Iraq had actually worked together.Despite this conclusion, you go to great lengths to try to justify the invasion of Iraq. "Links" or "contacts" obviously doesn't mean the two organizations were working together. In fact, considering the secular rule of Saddam and the fundamentalist foundations for bin Laden's organizations, the liklihood of finding anything meaningful is almost nil.

"... has not yet been found ..." So how long will it take before you conclude it didn't exist? This reminds me of the FBI investigation into the links of Martin Luther King with Communists in the early 60's. After some three years of spying and looking, a field supervisor wrote a report to Hoover stating that they had come up empty-handed. He concluded the report by saying that this just reinforced their resolve to find something on him. Of course, they never did.

The threat addressed by the Bush administration involved possible future actions by Iraq and al Qaeda. Faced with the evidence of contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq--which had indicated their desire to form a collaborative relationship--President Bush had to decide whether the probability that such a relationship would develop in the future was too great to ignore.The "threat" of an Iraq/al Quaida relationship was a myth perpatrated by Feith and Cheney. "Stovepiping" was the term used to direct raw data directly from the field to the Feith & Company and then to Cheney, bypassing CIA's analysis and confirmation processes.

The real threats of possible future actions against the U.S. by Iran and North Korea, however, were roundly ignored. And they remain a threat, even more real today. The administration, I suspect, didn't want to take on the NK or Iranian army with possible nuclear response. NK has a million-man army, and Iran is not too far behind. No, they preferred hitting the emasculated and withered army of Iraq. They just didn't plan for anything beyond the invasion as Shalikashvili (sp?) warned.

What a joke. Time will eventually open your eyes. Political incompetence was written all over this misadventure. History will write this off as a sad and destructive folly. Bush's legacy will rival Nixon's.

November 22, 2004 2:06 PM  
Blogger Al Hedstrom said...

One more thing.

Virtually every knowledgeable and reasonable person in the world believed--prior to the invasion--that Saddam's regime still possessed WMDs.The inspectors didn't believe it. Many in the CIA didn't believe it.

November 22, 2004 2:08 PM  
Blogger Micajah said...

Al, you stated: "Links" or "contacts" obviously doesn't mean the two organizations were working together.

I'm happy to see that you agree with me: Mick Horan was incorrect when he stated that there were no "links" between al Qaeda and Saddam's Iraq. It is obvious that there were several links, contacts, communications, talks, etc.--all done with a view toward establishing a collaborative relationship.

However, you spoiled it by following that moment of lucidity with this statement: In fact, considering the secular rule of Saddam and the fundamentalist foundations for bin Laden's organizations, the liklihood of finding anything meaningful is almost nil.I gave you the excerpts on a silver platter. Did you simply shut your eyes when you got to those excerpts, or did you think that the members of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission were suffering a psychotic break from reality when they made the following statement?

Chapter 2, page 61: Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda—save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against Crusaders” during the Gulf War of 1991.Did you form your opinion without considering the fact that Osama bin Laden tried to do what you claim he would never even consider doing? If you considered that fact, how did you conclude that he would never do what he wanted to do?

And, in your next comment, you stated regarding the belief that Iraq had WMDs: The inspectors didn't believe it. Many in the CIA didn't believe it.That's an interesting claim to make. It would be worth considering, if you cited the evidence you think can support it.

November 22, 2004 4:01 PM  

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